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Catholic Modernity and the Italian Constitution  
 
INTRODUCTION: CONSTITUTING POLITICAL MODERNITY 
Constitutions are founding texts for modern political life. The grounding principles 
exposed serve as underpinning guidelines for political life, and in a most technical sense: 
who can decide what, when, where and how. But much more is at stake. A constitution 
not only stipulates single rules; it also gathers these rules in meaningful ‘bundles’, 
ensuring an overarching division of powers. If society is a body, then the Constitution 
forms the skeleton. Constitutions guarantee political legitimacy at the most basic level, 
telling citizens why they must obey. They justify and delimit power. Max Weber’s famous 
definition of the modern state as that entity which holds monopoly of legitimate violence 
is surely reductionist, but it shows his keen understanding of the sociological dimension 
of law. By guaranteeing rights (as well as duties), constitutions also tell the citizens 
embraced and defined by the text how they can disagree, within the bounds of law.  
Constitutions are legal texts first and foremost, and written in that juristic 
Enlightenment-inspired language which—despite differences—has come to assume a 
striking similarity across the globe. We can see that constitutions differ, but we 
understand the language they speak. Constitutions are therefore also, in a broader vein, 
key documents of political modernity. As such they often come to assume an importance 
far beyond their institutional role. They do not simply stipulate principles: they bring 
those principles into existence. They have an enormous degree of annunciative power: 
they create by declaring. What they say is. The principles and ideals they espouse are 
formulated in a language of eternity: the present tense operated (‘The Federal Republic 
of Germany is…’ or ‘Italy is…’) is not meant to indicate a shifting present, quite the 
contrary: it lifts itself beyond historical time. The present-ness reads as the eternal 
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today—and as the eternal tomorrow. In fact, as etymology reminds us, the present is the 
here and now, but it is also that which is always before (‘pre’) being (‘esse’). It is always 
already there: it ‘simply’ presents itself, ceremonially so. The gift-giving aspects of the 
word ‘present’ rhymes with the temporal dimension: something is literally brought into 
somebody’s presence. 
Constitutions are both written and signed by historical persons, physical bodies. 
But it is a peculiar form of authorship. The writing subject is hidden away; the third 
person neutral gives voice. Very quickly the message of the text assumes its own life, 
becoming perfectly readable without knowing the author. The Constitution is a gift 
circulating without the giver. The text gains in meaningfulness exactly in the absence of 
the author; the message it sends is absorbed as the intentionality evaporates into the 
general ‘we’. In fact, constitutions, better than any other document, display all the 
features of that collective time-experience which Benedict Anderson recognised as lying 
at the heart of nationalism: progressive time, eternal time, secularized-sacred time, 
homogenous and ‘empty’, but brought together in an imagined community.i Its newness 
is formulated with respect to principles and values that are posited beyond time and 
space. God is replaced by People, hence its modern-ness; yet it is still a cosmogony, and 
it carries tempo-spatial transcendence within it. It is also therefore that constitutions can 
become salient reference points for social collective bodies at the level of identity, as the 
American experience documents so well: they bind together a populace across time and 
beyond social divisions.  
Put differently, the very notion of constitution harbours a double meaning: first, it 
concerns a written document and the rule of law emanating from itii; second, it refers to a 
constitutive act that precedes the establishment of a political regime, and constitutes a 
people as a political community. In the understanding of Thomas Paine, the American 
Constitution was not an act of government, but of a people constituting a government.iii 
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The constitution belongs to the social body; it is, in a sense, the social body declaring its 
own existence, emanating from the will of the people. The constitution is not only the 
skeleton of a political society; it is also its heart. The way it bespeaks itself into existence 
therefore matters. 
Following Derrida, constitutions may be analysed as ‘performative utterances’.  
Words become symbols within a symbolic matrix. The constitution is a speech act, and 
as such its language has affects far beyond the dissemination of what is right and wrong, 
what is a duty and what is a right: language performs and produces effects. Language 
becomes part of a world-making. Of course, the effectiveness and meaningfulness of 
discourse is context-dependent: not anyone can say the same words and bring about an 
effect. We can only ‘do things with words’iv if we are placed in the right position at the 
right moment.  ‘I pronounce you man and wife’, spoken at the end of wedding 
ceremony, has meaning and affect only if certain conditions are in place. Meaning is not 
attached in an intractable or permanent way to a particular set of signs, marks or sounds; 
it is brought about in a specific context, which is sociologically and historically bound. In 
Signature Event Context Derrida famously argued that this context-dependence is a con-
stitutive feature of all utterances; that all contexts are themselves contingent. There are, 
Derrida maintains, only contexts ‘without any centre or absolute anchoring’.v In fact, 
there is no ‘con-text’ that ‘explains’ the text: all we have are a series of texts which are 
themselves contingent. When we believe to establish a ‘con-text’ we are in fact engaged 
in writing yet another text.  
 We do not have to endorse all the epistemological consequences of Derrida’s de-
constructivist position to appreciate the point he makes, opening up ‘grounding’ texts 
such as constitutions or declarations of independences to a different kind of reading. 
Words do matter, and constitutions are indeed prime examples of political 
performativity, invested with an enormous load of symbolic power. From his more 
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sociological perspective, Bourdieu insisted that the power of words is nothing but the 
delegated power of the speaker.vi We therefore have to consider the social conditions for the 
effectiveness of ritual discourse. Taking a cue from Arnold van Gennep, we may indeed 
take one step further and consider the writing of a constitution as belonging to a rite of 
passage.vii Constitutions mark a transition. To be more precise: constitutions are the final 
outcomes of a ritual passage, its closing act. Where the neophytes in a ‘tribal setting’ 
going through a ritual passage to manhood have their new status stamped onto their 
physical body, shown and marked in front of his society ritually recognizing his new 
identity as a man,viii political societies have their new identity pinned down in the 
Constitution, closing the period of dramatic rupture and liminality that have typically 
preceded this phase of re-integration, as society is put back in place under the fold of a 
structuring order.ix In fact, constitutions are often written in the aftermath of a war or 
otherwise dramatic upheaval, in the conscious attempt to reinstall order in a world of 
chaos and loss of legitimacy. Constitutions blaze the trail from anti-structure to structure. 
Constitutions are key ‘closure events’ in rites of passage as gone through by large-scale 
societies. Using Bourdieu’s terminology, constitutions are prime examples of those ‘rites 
of institution’, e.g. consecration rites that bring about a change and simultaneously 
legitimise the very order they create.x To sum up: Constitutions are decisive performance 
acts within a period of transition that it helps to bring to a halt; in this process it shapes 
and moulds the new ‘normality’ which both annuls the previously existing and renders 
explicit, meaningful, legitimate, functional and cosmologically cohesive what is to come.  
 
CONSTITUTING ITALY AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II 
Ever since its official birth moment, 1 January 1948, the Italian Constitution has 
remained a touchstone in Italian politics and society. Studied in public schools from an 
early age, the document has also assumed an immense cultural-patriotic significance. 
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Whenever a political debate gets heated, participants will, at one point or the other, 
invoke both the letter and the spirit of the Constitution to back up one’s position or 
delegitimize that of the opponent. The ‘founding fathers’ of the Constitution are daily 
brought in play, in ways perhaps that they had not dared to envisage. Suggestions and 
attempts to rewrite the Constitution most often led to nothing, also because the 
Constitution itself (article 138) provided for an aggravated demanding procedure of 
revision.xi The object of contention has always been part II of the Constitution 
(Organisation of the Republic), not Part I (Rights and Duties of Citizens, articles 13-54), and 
much less what concerns us here: the so-called Founding Principles (articles 1-12). Media 
tycoon and former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi (1994-1995, 2001-2006, 2008-2011) 
made several dubious utterances in his years as a politician, evidently thriving rather well 
within that Derridean space void of an anchoring centre, but one of the most 
provocative and unpopular ones was no doubt in February 2009, when he described the 
Italian Constitution as a ‘Communist document’ or, even worse, as a ‘pro-Soviet 
document, made under the influence of a dictatorship’.xii In reality, with the Constitution 
Italy was exiting Mussolini’s dictatorship and the document was drafted by Christian 
Democrats, Communists, Socialists, republicans, liberals and other small political forces 
jointed in the spirit of anti-Fascism. Today, it is with very mixed feelings that Italians 
hear of centre-left prime minister Matteo Renzi’s attempt to alter parts of the 
Constitution toward a higher degree of ‘governability’. In fact, scepticism is in the air 
anytime someone proposes to change the wording and the substance of the Constitution. 
Somehow, the Italian Constitution has gained an aura of sacrality. Touching any part of 
it, and especially the initial part which stipulates the founding principles of the Republic, 
easily appears as an attack on the precarious compromise it represents and defends, 
risking to throw into the wide open all the latent conflicts lurking beneath its protective 
umbrella.xiii This is no doubt so because the very writing of the Constitution did 
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compromise the viewpoints of its founding fathers. It therefore fostered a compromise 
between the very composite segments of the Italian population that had voted the 
members of the Constituent Assembly into power on 2 June 1946—the very same day 
that gave birth to the Republic.  
The aim of this article is simple: We want to assess the momentous turn in Italian 
politics that the writing of the Constitution signaled. Approaching the Italian constitution 
as a ‘rite of passage’, and as a ‘performative utterance’, there is one specific aspect of the 
Constitution that we would here like to focus on: the specific way in which the Italian 
citizen became symbolically ‘coded’ as a ‘person’ and not as an ‘individual’, inspired by 
Catholic principles. What interests us here is less the legal dimension of citizenship, and 
less the social consequences of the formulations eventually adopted; what we would like 
to discuss is the underlying semantics and the wider symbolic universe that came to 
underpin those rules, trying to provide Italy not only with an institutional skeleton, but 
also a heart and spirit.  
Our argument therefore rests on the assumption that what is at stake in the writing 
of a constitution is indeed the grounding of political legitimacy in a philosophical 
anthropology. As famously argued by Eric Voegelin in his dispute with Hans Kelsen 
(probably the world’s most famous constitutionalist ever), the political language adopted 
in constitutional writing must be understood as symbols of ideological self-interpretation. 
In The Authoritarian State (1936), no doubt one of his most important Vienna 
publications, Voegelin fundamentally charged Kelsen with ignoring the content of 
human life, thus disregarding the necessary sociological and anthropological foundations 
of any political theory; and of similarly ignoring the question of pre-constituted meaning. 
Relatedly, in his approach to the history of political thought, one of Voegelin’s crucial 
methodological insights was that ‘ideologies’ had to be analysed as symbolizations of 
human experiences.xiv 
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Here it must be remembered that the Italian Constitution was written in a real 
‘empty space’,xv with no foregone conclusions, in a historical figuration of quite radical 
contingency, which we have elsewhere conceptualized as a liminal moment.xvi Liberal 
pre-Fascist constitutional traditions were potentially available, but evidently could not 
solve the challenges faced. The Constituent Assembly elaborated the final document 
under a cloud of uncertainty: what next? As such, its members were forced to focus on 
the (imagined) future more than on present aims and objectives—opening the ground 
for a virtuous and vital compromise across political, ideological and philosophical 
divides.xvii Unlike Japan and (if to a lesser extent) West Germany, the Anglo-American 
allies left the constitutional process for the Italians to deal with.xviii The future was up for 
grabs. 
Concretely, our aim is to analyze the Catholic contribution to the Italian 
Constitution. In this context we discuss what we have elsewhere tried to capture as the 
Catholic ‘appropriation of modernity’.xix Scholars often insist that Christian Democracy, 
especially in its Catholic-Italian version, represented no real tradition of political thought, 
but was merely a means toward establishing strong ruling parties.xx This judgment might 
be motivated by the undeniable dullness of Christian Democratic politicians; but more 
likely it is explained by the fact that scholars never took Christian Democracy seriously as 
a political idea.xxi In Italy this perception was reinforced by revelations about Tangentopoli 
(‘Bribesville’, a metaphor for a huge corruption scandal discovered in the early 1990s). 
To be sure, the Cold War, American financial and political support, and the ‘occupation’ 
of the Italian state by Christian Democracy were important in ensuring its hold on power 
from the end of World War II until 1994. Yet, the role of ideas cannot be easily 
dismissed. At the end of the war, a reliable ideological body had to be distilled against the 
background of Fascism. From a Catholic perspective, this body had to appear as 
authentically universal without succumbing to Church dogma, yet present itself as 
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particularly Italian—thus, Christian Democrats formulated a profusion of ideas 
conducive to the adaptation of Italian Catholicism to the standards of a modern 
democracy and a fairly advanced welfare state. Engaging Catholic contributions to the 
Constitution therefore means to engage a crucial chapter of Italian history and politics. 
We argue that Catholic thought and social philosophy had a direct impact on political 
life—clearly visible in the drafting of the Constitution; this, in turn, indexes how Catholic 
ideas sought to interpret and give direction to the very idea of political modernity. The 
specific argument therefore pertains to a larger theoretical discussion concerning 
modernity and ‘multiple modernities’.xxii  
 
FROM CAMALDOLI TO THE CONSTITUTION 
Catholic debates on the new constitutional architecture of post-Fascist Italy started while 
World War II was still on, and even before Mussolini’s fall from power on 24-25 July 
1943. From 18 to 23 July 1943, members of the Movimento Laureati (‘Association of 
Catholic Graduates and Professionals’) and exponents of the Istituto Cattolico di Attività 
Sociali (‘Catholic Institute of Social Activities’) drew up the so-called ‘Code of Camaldoli’, 
a work of social culture that consciously attempted to update the Code of Malines, the 
first attempt of formulating a Catholic social doctrine, produced in 1927 by the 
International Union of Social Studies in Malines (Belgium).  Entitled For the Christian 
Community: Principles of the Social Order Drawn Up by a Group of Friends of Camaldoli, the 
document was published only in 1945 but circulated in the underground beforehand. 
The Code was heavily inspired by the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and represented a 
summa of thought on society, economy and state organization in light of Catholic 
doctrine.  It contained a consciously articulated Catholic proposal to rebuild a new social 
and political order at the end of the war. The model for an ideal society cherished by 
young Catholic intellectuals was inspired by Christianity, but it was also rooted in the 
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concrete analysis of class dynamics, the existing social groups within Italy, and a concrete 
understanding of the its political and institutional life. What was needed, apart from the 
theoretical and spiritual input, was to ‘ascertain how persons and groups could be 
concretely engaged in the social and political dynamic’.xxiii  
After an introduction on the ‘premise on the spiritual foundation of the social life’, 
the Code focused on State, Family, Education, Work, Production and Exchange, Economic 
Activity, and International Life.xxiv In a sense, the Code stipulated the framing of a 
government program. It affirmed the necessity of state intervention in the economy, 
consciously indicating a ‘third way’ beyond pure market capitalism and state socialism, 
half a century before the Giddens-Blair ticket. It also pleaded for a decentralized, almost 
federalist organization of the State, based on strong local autonomy. An essential 
characteristic was the identification of solidarity and social justice as primary aims of the 
State on par with safeguarding freedom.  
Sergio Paronetto, probably the major contributor to the Code, advocated the need 
to concentrate upon the historical contingency. With great independence from Catholic 
social teaching, he believed that socio-economic issues must be measured and dealt with 
on their own inherent terms—albeit firmly grounded in a Christian conscience and a 
spirituality shaped by the ‘ascetic of the man of action’.xxv Paronetto refrained from direct 
engagement from party-political activities. However he cooperated with Alcide De 
Gaperi, who would became the first Catholic prime minister of Italy (1945-1954), in the 
elaboration of the 1943 Reconstructive Ideas of Christian Democracy—the document that lay 
down the party’s organizational-intellectual foundations. It is also for this reason that the 
Camaldoli Code gave momentum to Christian Democratic dynamic reformism as it came 
to effect in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and supported Catholic participation to the 
writing of the Constitution.xxvi 
POST-WAR DELIBERATIONS AND THE ROLE OF THE ‘DOSSETTIANI’ 
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Catholic debate on the new Constitution continued with even more energy in the 
months following the end of the war.xxvii For example, the nineteenth ‘social week of 
Italian Catholics’, held in Florence in October 1945, dealt directly with ‘Constitution and 
Constituent Assembly’.xxviii Quite crucially, a group of left-leaning Christian Democratic 
thinkers and politicians became involved in the drafting of the Constitution, sitting on 
the board appointed to draw up the new charter. Giuseppe Dossetti (a young Canon Law 
professor from the Catholic University in Milan) and Giorgio La Pira (one of the 
‘Camaldoli’s friends’, later to become mayor of Florence) were the most prominent 
figures in this group of intellectuals, often called not without sarcasm the professorini 
(young, fledgling professors), or also the dossettiani. The movement Civitas Humana 
(founded in 1946) and the journal Cronache Sociali (1947-1951) served as a platform to 
articulate the group’s ideals and plans for the institutional, social, and economic design of 
postwar Italy.xxix 
Dossetti had fought in the Resistance and served in the Committee of National 
Liberation.xxx In 1945 he was made vice-secretary of the Christian Democracy and tried 
to open the party to pacifist and even socialist ideas. He had been deeply impressed by 
the Labour party’s 1945 election victory in Britain.xxxi He and his circle of friends and 
collaborators became enthusiastic admirers of Stanford Cripps’s ‘Christian socialism’ and 
engaged with John Maynard Keynes and William Henry Beveridge by mistakenly taking 
them for Labour politicians. xxxii La Pira drew extensively on Keynes, Lord Beveridge, The 
Economist, and Jesus Christ, collectively seen as the ultimate economic and spiritual points 
of reference. In 1950 he published two articles in which he explained the relevance of 
Keynes for post-war Italy, arguing that his economic policy was in tune with the 
Gospels.xxxiii 
Formed in the 1930s, in the intellectual climate of the Università Cattolica, Milan—at 
that time engaged in a harsh controversy with the Idealist conception of the Ethical State 
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developed by the Fascist premier philosopher Giovanni Gentile—the professorini were 
also fascinated by French legal-social currents of thinking, including authors such as 
Léon Duguit, Maurice Hauriou and Georges Gurvitch, not to mention the ‘institutional’ 
ideas of the Italian constitutionalist, Santi Romano, who had always shown a special 
concern with social reality on which legislation should be based.xxxiv During the 1930s 
Dossetti and many other future dossettiani had flirted with Fascism, which they at the time 
considered to be the best available model for the preservation of Catholic values. Yet vis-
à-vis the increasing association of Fascism with Nazism and its racial policies, Dossetti 
drifted away from traditional Catholic intransigence and ‘romanità’, still advocated in 
1940 by the founder of the Cattolica Agostino Gemelli.xxxv Strongly influenced by the 
experience of war, Dossetti, as other Catholics around him, began searching for a 
Catholic response to the challenge of modern mass politics. His aim was to bring the 
Church into alliance with the modern world. Dossetti saw that it was necessary to take a 
stance, and become directly involved in active politics, first by fighting in the Resistance 
alongside communists and socialists, and later by active militancy in the Christian 
Democracy. At the intellectual level, the search for a Catholic response to the challenges 
of modern society, meant bringing into the new democratic culture of postwar Italy the 
thoughts the dossettiani had avidly read and carefully reflected upon in the 1930s—those 
of a number of European Catholic thinkers who had led the way in embracing crucial 
aspects of modernity and human rights as indispensable to a proper Catholic view of the 
world. 
This is important to understand. At the political-institutional level the interwar 
years were disastrous for political Catholicism, in Italy as well as in Germany and in other 
European countries.xxxvi However, Catholic thought had not come to a standstill, 
developing in fact as a meditation on the failures and setbacks of the interwar period. At 
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the end of the war, Italian Catholic politicians found inspiration from across the Alps. A 
central figure in the debates remained the French philosopher Jacques Maritain.  
 
MARITAIN: THE CATHOLIC GROUNDING OF  
THE DEMOCRATIC ORDER IN THE HUMAN ‘PERSON’ 
Maritain had been close to the quasi-fascist Action Française in the 1920s. He had 
abandoned the movement when it was condemned by the Vatican in 1926.xxxvii Working 
within a neo-Thomist philosophical framework, in the 1930s he started to embrace 
human rights and modern democracy. In particular, his 1936 study Humanisme Intégrale 
and his 1942 pamphlet Christianisme et démocratie—which was dropped by Allies plans over 
Europe in 1943—had constituted a decisive endorsement of the ultimately Christian 
nature of democracy.  
 It would be wrong to reduce this development to the French context. What 
slowly took shape during the 1930s happened in a transnational dialogue. As discussed 
by Samuel Moyn, also with reference to the work of James Chapell, the idea of the 
human person as the bearer of ‘constitutional dignity’ can be traced back to the Irish 
constitution of 1937. A hugely influential document here was the 1937 encyclical Divini 
redemptoris, which fundamentally asserted the dignity of the human person. The encyclical 
was as a direct response to the secular narrative of ‘rights’ and dignity bestowed upon the 
‘depersonalized individual’ running from the French Revolution, and taken to extremes 
by the Communist regimes. Divini redemptoris is in fact a scathing attack on Communism 
by Pius XI.xxxviii    
However, in the Italian context there is no doubt that French developments were 
of primary importance, and Maritain’s ideas were the ones with the most direct influence. 
Central to Maritain’s theory and definition of democracy was the concept of the ‘person’ 
and its opposition to the ‘individual’. The ‘person’ has a spiritual and transcendent 
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nature, irreducible to biology, and a concern for the good of all. It flourishes only within 
community and in relation with God—and, through God, with the good of all. 
Maritain’s writing influenced the emerging philosophy of ‘communitarian 
personalism’, and for a while Maritain acted as a mentor to its leading proponent 
Emmanuel Mounier.xxxix During the 1930s Mounier and the group around the journal 
Esprit condemned both Communism and liberal individualism as forms of materialism. 
Liberal individualism, in particular, was held responsible for what Mounier disdained as 
‘le desordre établi’, his designation for the corrupt parliamentary politics of the French 
Third Republic and for a political culture associated with the heritage of the French 
revolution; as he put it, ‘on the altar of this sad world, there is but one god, smiling and 
hideous: the Bourgeois’.xl As an alternative to the materialist twins of liberalism and 
Communism, Mounier insisted that the ‘person’, as opposed to the isolated ‘individual’, 
always realized him-herself in a community, while retaining a spiritual dimension that 
could never be absorbed into the politics of this world. At the practical level, Mounier 
and the personalists endorsed a society with a vigorous group life (not unlike the English 
pluralists), and characterized by the decentralization of the decision-making process to 
the grassroots or to communities with a human dimension. Mounier’s concrete proposals 
were perhaps harmless. However, his rhetoric and expectations were revolutionary and 
hotly anti-liberal. Thus, he could briefly see room for the personalists in the Vichy regime 
during the war, and in Communism and Soviet Marxism after the war.xli 
Maritain’s philosophy had effects outside intellectual circles. Maritain played a key 
role in drafting the United Nation Declaration of Human Rights. Charles De Gaulle 
made him French ambassador to the Vatican after the war, from 1945 to 1948—a 
timeframe that coincided with the birth of Italian democracy and the emergence of 
Catholics as the country’s new ruling class. Maritain played a crucial role in the Council 
Vatican II, together with John Courtney Murray and other lay intellectuals, and he was 
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presented by Pope Paul VI with the ‘Message to the Philosophers’ at the closing of the 
Council.xlii  
Both Maritain and Mounier were in fact not necessarily in favor of founding 
explicitly Christian parties; rather, as Maritain repeated time and again, Christianity 
should be something like the ‘yeast’ of political life, making the liberation from pagan 
Fascism the first step to a new political cultural based on moral and, to some degree, 
religious argument.xliii  ‘The question’, Maritain wrote, ‘does not deal … with Christianity 
as a religious creed and road to eternal life, but rather with Christianity as leaven in the 
social and political life of nations and as bearer of the temporal hope of mankind … as 
historical energy at work in the world’.xliv In 1934, intervening in a fracas between 
Mounier and Catholic philosopher Paul Archambault, Maritain insisted that the new 
Christianity could not be equated with a party program, being ‘of a freer and more 
elevated order, which on the contrary seeks to renew the very manner of posing the 
problem’. Integral humanism ‘could not be reduced to any of the operative ideologies in 
the political formation due to the nineteenth century and still extant’.xlv 
Even more harshly—given his view on man, God and the world—Mounier, who 
had next to nothing to do with the drafting of the UNDHR, could not accept Christian 
Democracy; in fact he disliked Christian Democracy as a party project both in France, in 
the 1930s, and in the post-WWII era. Elections, party politics, and coalition 
governments—he thought—meant compromise and consequently corruption. His 
‘democratic’ credential should not be overstated; actually his anti-liberalism sometimes 
bordered on anti-democratism.xlvi In this as on a whole range of issues, he 
characteristically adopted ambivalent positions. He strongly affirmed the existence of 
transcended truth, but refused to grant absolute validity to any particular human 
expression of that truth. Thus Mounier shared with his mentor, Charles Peguy, the desire 
to incarnate the spiritual in the temporal; he also believed, like the Christian Democrats, 
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in ‘engagement’. Yet Mounier also spoke warningly of the ‘temptation to political action’, 
and wrote in one of his essays in the early years of Esprit: ‘Is not any action condemned 
to inefficacy to the extent that it will be pure, impure to the extent that it will be 
efficacious?’xlvii He was caught firmly on the horns of this dilemma throughout his 
political career as editor of Esprit.  His conviction that Christians must be in but not of 
the world forced him to walk his theological-philosophical tightrope publicly. He was 
strongly anti-bourgeois but found himself cooperating with bourgeois politicians during 
every major crisis of the thirties, from the Spanish Civil War to the Munich crisis and 
beyond. He consistently criticized the Christian Democrats as too clerical and 
confessional, yet his own faith keep him from an outright commitment to the Popular 
Front, which had to be content with a fraternal salute in 1936. His antagonist 
Archambault accused him of imprecision, negation of capitalism tout court and doctrinal 
incoherence. For Mounier, then and later, the Christian Democrats were compromised 
by the liberal established disorder of the Third and Fourth Republics. He was 
consistently severe with regard to ‘Christian Democratism’, its inadequacies and its 
dishonest compromises. The question is: can one make a temporal commitment, 
especially one to radical anti-capitalism, without being involved in the established 
disorder? 
 
FRENCH CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHY GOES TO ITALY 
Without ridding itself of all of its open-ended questions and unresolved tensions, the 
thought of Maritain and Mounier came to constitute an important reference point for 
Christian Democrats in Europe and in Italy—including De Gasperi and the professorini. 
They would adopt the language of personalism as theirs as they became involved in the 
constitutional process.xlviii 
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Following closely their French inspirers, the professorini criticized individualistic 
liberalism and saw the person as deeply embedded in a moral community.  They saw 
their role and their analytical-moral effort within the larger picture of political modernity 
and what had gone wrong within this historical experience. They were driven by the idea 
of ‘transcending the principles of 1789’, as La Pira once put it.xlix Or, as La Pira put it 
commenting on the Constitution a few weeks after it took effect, ‘the human personality 
unfolds through organic belonging to the successive social communities in which it is 
contained and via which it steadily develops and perfects itself’.l  
La Pira was one of the experts on the principles of civil relations sitting on the 
board appointed to draw up the Constitution. Harking back to Hippolyte Taine, he 
explicitly stated that Rousseau’s ‘individualistic’ principles must be revised in a return to 
an ‘organic’ universe. La Pira quoted Mounier and his Déclarations des droits des personnes et 
des communautés, which was written in 1941 and debated at the height of the Resistance in 
the pages of Esprit under the questioning title: ‘Should We Rewrite the Bill of Human 
Rights?’li 
The professorini were aiming at an Italian version of a labour-based ‘integral’ 
democracy based on a holistic vision of the human person which could realize a 
Christian-inspired solidarity throughout Italian society and its institutional ramifications. 
Democracy could not have the ‘empty’ individual as the basic building block. Likewise, 
the economic order, based on market mechanisms, could not be justified with reference 
to purely economic principles, void of values. The economy had to be founded on the 
person; and the ultimate goal of economic development would always have to be 
referred back to the person and his or her fulfilment in a meaningful community (hence 
the slogan, ‘First the person, then the market’).  Throughout the post-war period, this 
idea would not be easy to implement within a wider socio-economic context of 
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advancing capitalism and a slowly unfolding consumerism based on the American way of 
life, exploding with the ‘economic miracle’ from the mid-1950s.lii  
There were profound disagreements between Dossetti (and his group) and De 
Gasperi.liii The dossettiani wanted a sharper distinction between ‘Catholic’ and ‘political’ 
action—or, as Maritain would have said, between the ‘temporal’ and the ‘spiritual’. The 
party, they believed, must operate not only as anti-Communist force—a generic public-
opinion movement gathering consensus—but also as a centre of cultural elaboration and 
proposal of a reformist political action.liv Dossetti would become more and more 
pessimistic about the possibility of Christian Democratic reformism. He was deeply 
dissatisfied with De Gasperi’s government line which he openly criticized for lacking a 
serious social program. He was appalled by Italy’s NATO accession and by the 
government’s aggressive attitude towards the East.lv In 1951 he chose to dissolve his 
faction in the party and retired to monastic life—only to return for a while in 1956, when 
he ran unsuccessfully for mayor in the Communist stronghold Bologna.lvi Dossetti lost 
the belief that politics could be reformed from within. He became increasingly convinced 
that Italian politics could be reformed only on the condition that the Church be 
reformed so that it could regain its leading role. This conviction pushed him to play an 
important role in the Second Vatican Council.  
 
THE PROFESSORINI AND THE CONSTITUTION: CATHOLICISM AT WORK  
Implementing Catholic philosophy in real life was never bound to be an easy task. But as 
concerns the preparation and writing of the Constitution, the enterprise was largely 
successful. Let us briefly sum-up where and how. 
For a start, the professorini and the Left of the DC managed to have their version of 
the first article of Constitution passed: the ‘personalist’ wording ‘Italy is a democratic 
Republic founded upon work’—elaborated and proposed by Amintore Fanfani, another 
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of the young professorini—prevailed over ‘Italy is a democratic republic of workers’ 
proposed by the Communist leader Palmiro Togliatti and a number of Socialists.lvii The 
difference may seem minimal at a first glance, but it steered from the very outset the 
wording of the entire document away from a Socialist worldview. 
Another expression in article 2—which makes a strong allusion to the rights of 
man—can be traced to Catholic viewpoint and social philosophy, namely: ‘The Republic 
recognizes and guarantees the inalienable rights of man, both as an individual and in the 
social orders wherein he develops his personality. The Republic demands the fulfilment 
of the binding duties of political, economic, and social solidarity’.  
The rights of man (and woman, we should now add) are legally proclaimed to be 
inviolable, but they are not suggested as ‘sacred’ and least of all ‘natural’. The professorini 
were not at all proposing a return to pre-modern legal thinking: they were applying 
Christian philosophy within the parameters of the modern episteme. As a matter of fact, 
the dossettiani agreed with the other founding fathers to exclude meta-positive rights.lviii 
Interpreters of the Italian Constitution cannot escape the often neglected fact that Part I 
of the Constitution recites the ‘Rights and Duties of Citizens’, much more similar to the 
Weimar Constitution of 11 August 1919 did (Grundrechte und Grundpflichten der Deutschen) 
than to the French Declaration of 26 August 1789, entitled ‘Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and of Citizens’. And it is remarkably clear how the ‘rights’ are immediately related 
to the social level, and to the duties involved in the bringing about of social solidarity. 
Using an anachronistic language, the wording is Communitarian rather than Liberal. 
Article 3 in turn stated (states!) that ‘It is the Republic’s duty to remove obstacles 
of an economic and social order physically constricting the freedom and equality of 
citizens and thus impeding the full development of the human person’. The conclusive 
words of article 3—‘and the effective participation of all workers in the political and 
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social organization of the country’—confirmed the dossettiani’s will to collaborate with 
socialists and communists in order to steer away from liberal individualism.  
As should be clear from now, the term ‘person’ implies a totally different value 
from that of ‘individual’ as employed in liberal thought penetrating most democratic 
constitutions. And it is this worldview that emanates from the core, from the founding 
principles that hold up the edifice. 
 
FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE LETTER AND  
THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION 
Thanks to the effort of Dossetti—and certainly also to his will and skills to develop a 
dialogue with socialists and communists—the Constitution enshrined not only the 
primacy of the human person as a part of a social union (that is also a spiritual union), 
but also the principle of freedom as a responsibility. The Catholic view of freedom was 
alternative, if not the opposite, to the idea of freedom elaborated by most currents of 
modern Constitutionalism. Freedom could only be accepted as the positive freedom to 
uphold the common good. In close affinity with Togliatti and the communists, the very 
young Dossetti-follower Aldo Moro declared—in a debate of the Constituent Assembly 
of 2 October 1946 (at the first subcommittee for the preparatory text of the 
Constitution)—that ‘liberty in a democratic system is one that aims not to permit 
individual free will to be attained, but the full expression of a person’s values, as well as 
positive collaboration by individuals to achieve the common good’.lix The debate 
concerned an article for the Constitution proposed by La Pira—with the explicit aim of 
‘endowing liberty with a different meaning than the one underlying the 1789 
Declaration’—which stated:  
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The liberties guaranteed by this Constitution must be implemented to 
perfect the human person, in tune with the demands of social solidarity and 
toward the improvement of democracy by means of an increasingly active 
and conscious participation of all to the common good. Hence liberty is the 
foundation of responsibility (1 October 1946).lx 
 
This article, however, was not included in the final draft of the Constitution, 
despite the strong defence of Moro and Dossetti. However, even when unsuccessful, it is 
evident that the activism of Dossetti and the professorini hugely influenced the discussions 
held by the committee for the preparatory text for the Constitution. There was much 
debate, for instance, over whether the right to ‘resistance’ should be included in the text 
of the Constitution. The draft of the Constitution included indeed an article that read, 
‘the individual and collective resistance to oppression is a right and a duty of the citizen 
when the public powers violate the rights and fundamental liberties guaranteed by the 
Constitution’. This proposal followed a suggestion by Dossetti, and met with sharp 
opposition.lxi Over the course of the debate, the view that it was impossible to legally 
regulate something that, by its nature, was removed from the sphere of positive law 
prevailed, and the article was not approved.lxii  
 Liberty and equality, far from being tools for identifying rival ideologies, are 
mutually reconciled in light of the ‘full human person’s development’ enshrined in 
Article 3, which is made the cutting edge of constitutional principles. Civil, political, 
social and economic rights are accordingly recognised and granted. Rights of the 
individual are granted within communities such as families, schools, unions, parties, 
churches. Social and political pluralism becomes part of the constitutional landscape, 
grounded in what Mounier had talked about as a ‘communitarian personalism’. 
 The pluralistic philosophy expressed here shines through in other parts of the 
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document. For example, the second part of the Constitution, concerning the Republic’s 
institutional framework, articulates public power both as shared among diverse 
institutions at the central level (parliament, government, president of the Republic, 
referendum, judiciary and Constitutional court), and among the State and local 
authorities, including regions, provinces and municipalities. This articulation is more 
sophisticated than Montesquieu’s separation of powers, reflecting not only the need for 
granting citizens liberties, but also an essentially pluralistic view of democracy. 
 
CONCLUSION AND FURTHER PERSPECTIVES 
Our initial conclusion can be easily stated: The wordings of the Constitution discussed 
above represented small but significant results of a battle over values and visions of 
modernity won by the dossettiani. It was certainly a symbolic victory for the professorini, and 
with a lasting effect. The professorini had sought and contributed to build a post-liberal 
democracy, with distinct spiritual foundations. Moreover, the writing of the Constitution 
was the first political-cultural operation led by Catholic lay intellectuals and politicians 
without support from the Vatican. Christian Democracy achieved what political 
Catholicism had until then only been dreaming of: to regain a leading role in the modern 
world.  
The wider perspectives to infer from this cannot here be fully elaborated in any 
detail, but let us at least sketch two dimensions involved that may prompt further 
theoretical reflection.  
First, the Italian narrative is evidently not only an Italian story. The centrality of the 
‘person’, a ‘social’ view of the economy, the defense of non-statal entities, from the 
family to the Church, and the valorization of forms of organization which were both 
political (parties) and corporative (trade unions): these were principles introduced, via 
Christian Democracy, not only in the Italian Constitution but also in European ‘core’ 
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countries, France and West Germany.lxiii This amply testifies that the received wisdom 
saying that Christian Democracy should not be taken very seriously as an autonomous 
political philosophy with real-world agency, simply does not stand up to scrutiny.  
The Catholic imprint on the Constitution happened precisely as Catholics, through 
Christian Democracy, was becoming the dominant political force of the new republican 
Italy, and central actors in the process of building a modern mass democracy and a 
welfare state. Christian Democracy was in post-World War II Italy, as in many other 
European countries, the central forum for institutionalizing Catholic modernity—a 
momentous turn in Italian and European history that in retrospect is easy to miss. And in 
this vein let us simply remark the fact that this very same philosophical luggage had quite 
some influence on another group of founding fathers, namely those of the European 
community.lxiv Granted the increasingly heated discussions over Europe’s founding 
values, and the deepening crisis of European integration, this perhaps deserves slightly 
more attention than what is currently the case. 
Second, the Christian Democratic political thought epitomized in the writings and 
reflections of Dossetti and the professorini, was instrumental towards a shift of attitude 
that took place in the post-World War II period, where the Church, and Catholicism writ 
large, came to endorse ‘modernity’, or perhaps better, became a ‘partner’ of modernity. 
However this shift of orientation did not simply mean to accept and embrace modernity 
in its current shape.  Nor did it mean, as implied by Paolo Pombeni, and as uncritically 
carried forward in the analysis offered by Jan-Werner Müller, to simply put forward 
liberal values once again, couched in a different vocabulary, with only cosmetic reference 
to a set of different ideaslxv: it meant, on the contrary, to develop and re-substantiate the 
modern call to freedom from within a classical and Christian tradition, opening the way 
for a ‘integral’ or ‘organic’ or also ‘evangelical’ or ‘spiritual’ post-liberal democracy. Such 
wording may sound vague and inherently open to interpretation, and questions certainly 
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abound concerning its political realization. But may not the same be said about liberal 
formulas?  We are not here simply dealing with a thinly veiled liberalism, mere jargon 
which did not alter a quintessential liberal substance re-emerging triumphantly after the 
‘parenthesis’ of Fascism; we are dealing indeed with an alternative vision and political 
model, one that developed as a reflection on the misadventures of Fascism and as a 
critique of classical liberalism. Dossetti hated liberalism; in a way, liberalism represented 
the most serious of historical enemies to a healthy social and political order, as he 
explained in an emblematic letter he as partisan commander sent to the priests of the 
Appenines in March 1945.lxvi  
It is only within this political-cum-epistemological horizon that we can understand 
the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Christian-Catholic philosophy was no mere 
cosmetics, nor did it simply mark a transition towards the post-war liberal order.  Quite 
the contrary: the Constitution closed the liminal period and in van Gennep’s original 
terminology, marked the ‘re-aggregation’, the constitution of a new, different order. It 
thus symbolized the successful closure of a double transition: from Monarchy to 
Republic and from Fascism to Democracy. It marked a new beginning, which was based 
on the historical compromise between Catholics, Social-Communists and other forces 
that had fought against Fascism—that is, it was based in the experience of the period of 
transition, 1943-1945, and the anti-Fascist struggle. The ‘transition’ unfolded within the 
realm of empirical history; Christian Democracy/political Catholicism brought it to an 
end. Or, to put it even more simply:  Christian Democracy is not an ‘ideology of 
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